The 18th BRICS summit held its first session in New Delhi on Sept. 12 local time and adopted a joint declaration. Leaders attending stated in the text their opposition to unilateral sanctions imposed without UN authorization, and urged restraint by concerned parties over the situation in the Middle East.

The declaration characterized such measures as undermining international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and called for their elimination. It named no country, but commentators read the language against the backdrop of the armed conflict in the Middle East that has continued since late February and the sanctions environment around it.

On trade, the declaration expressed serious concern over the spread of unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures that contravene World Trade Organization rules. It also recorded a recognition that the risks of nuclear threats and armed conflict have risen overall.

A Declaration Adopted by Consensus

The New Delhi text was adopted by consensus with no member state raising a formal objection. Since the group's enlargement, coordination over the strength of wording in joint documents has repeatedly dragged on, which drew attention to the adoption process itself.

Chinese diplomatic authorities said the summit brought the total of BRICS outcome documents to more than 60. Most are sectoral cooperation papers covering financial and trade settlement, science and technology, health, agriculture and people-to-people exchange.

In his remarks at the first session, Xi reviewed two decades of BRICS development and said member states should play a leading role in the face of the currents of the age. He also expressed an intention to contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf.

China to Chair in 2027

Xi announced in the same speech that China will serve as BRICS chair in 2027 and host the 19th summit. It would be China's first turn in the chair since the 2017 Xiamen summit, a decade earlier.

The chair sets the annual calendar of meetings and the order of agenda priorities. With China taking the chair for the first time since enlargement, attention has turned to how the expanded grouping's working methods and criteria for reviewing new members will be organized.

Bilateral meetings also ran alongside the summit. Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed in a separate meeting to sustain the improvement in relations, and Modi said afterwards that differences between the two countries should not be allowed to turn into disputes.

Between the Text and the Ground

The wording does not translate directly into policy. BRICS is not a body that issues binding decisions but closer to a consultative platform in which agreed documents are absorbed by each state according to its own circumstances.

On sanctions alone, members' interests diverge. Energy exporters and importers, and countries with high or low exposure to US and European markets, read the weight of the declaration differently.

The same applies to the trade language. A number of the states that signed a declaration demanding compliance with WTO rules have themselves expanded measures to protect domestic industry in recent years.

A Third View: Implementation Routes Matter More Than Length of Text

This paper keeps its distance both from readings that treat the declaration as a manifesto of bloc confrontation and from those that dismiss it as words without effect. The significance of a BRICS document lies not in the force of its phrasing but in the working routes those phrases are later moved onto. How many of the 60-odd outcome documents become actual changes to settlement, customs or certification procedures is the measure.

For ethnic Chinese readers in Korea this is not a distant conference. Many BRICS members are major trading partners of Korea, and even small changes in settlement currency or trade documentation convert immediately into cost and time for those in the trade business. That is why the notices each country issues afterwards sit closer to daily life than the declaration's general sections.

Three things are worth watching. First, how many of the adopted outcome documents carry a stated implementation timetable. Second, whether the call for restraint over the Middle East translates into the diplomatic conduct of individual members. Third, how the standing of new members and partner states is settled under the Chinese chairmanship in 2027.